GFI (HK) Securities LLC v Gyong Hee Kang
Civil procedure – interlocutory injunction – inter-dealer broker – restraint against ex-employee – whether damages adequate remedy – balance of convenience
This was a judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Saunders. The full Reasons for Decision can be found here: http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=99092&QS=%2B&TP=JU
Background
A senior financial broker working on GFI’s Korea desk was bought out of her contract by ICAP (the 2nd Defendant). She had earlier signed an employment contract with GFI which contained the following post termination restrictions (in broad terms):
(i) Non-compete: for 6 months immediately after termination of the contract not to be involved in any relevant business, defined as any business carried on by GFI at the termination date (clause 15.4);
(ii) Non-deal: for 6 months immediately after the termination of the contract not to accept will facilitate the acceptance of orders or instructions from any person who in the previous 12 months had been a client (clause 15.5.1.2);
(iii) Non-solicit: for 6 months immediately after termination of the contact not to directly or indirectly canvas or solicit business from any person who was a client of GFI in the previous 12 months, nor to accept or facilitate the acceptance of orders or instructions from any such client (clause 15.5.1.1).
The ex-employee raised three arguments in resisting the injunction application: (1) Non-compete: if this were pursued, this would entirely prevent her from working. (2) Delay: GFI did not act within a reasonable period of time, as required. (3) Restraint: a 6 month restraint was not reasonable and would be unenforceable.
Analysis
(1) Non-compete – GFI agreed to abandon this claim.
(2) Delay – the Court agreed that an interlocutory injunction must be sought without delay: King Fung Vacuum Ltd v Toto Toys Ltd [2006] 2 HKLRD 785 at 792, §20:
“There has traditionally been a strong requirement when interlocutory injunctions have been sought, that the plaintiff must show that it has acted promptly and without delay. Promptly in the circumstances of interlocutory injunctions has been commonly understood to be a period of 6 weeks or so of unexplained delay and 3 months with an explanation for the delay in making application for an injunction. …. It stands to reason that if (a plaintiff) is prepared to allow matters to proceed and takes no action with respect to matters which have been extant for lengthy periods, it lies ill in (the plaintiff’s) mouth to say that there is likely to be in repairable damage.”
However, it accepted that the time it took for GFI to properly gather evidence to mount an application was reasonable. Hence there was no delay found here.
(c) Duration of restraint – Saunders DCHJ accepted that, at an interlocutory stage, the question to be asked is whether it is plain and obvious that the restraints will fail after an examination at a trial. If it is not plain and obvious, the clauses must at this stage be regarded as having a reasonable prospect of being upheld: see Arbuthnot Fund Managers Ltd v Rawlings [2003] EWCA Civ 518, at §30, per Chadwick J.
The judge held that it was satisfied that GFI had a reasonable prospect of success at trial in establishing that the restraints are reasonable and no more than necessary.
Commentary
Sauders DCHJ considered the matter from an inter partes perspective such that he did not analyse with any depth the reasonableness of the restraints in this case. Having applied the “plain and obvious” test (see above) to meet the low threshold needed at the interlocutory stage, it is arguable whether GFI would succeed at trial where the thresholds would be much higher.
Clearly the timing of the ex-employee’s employment with ICAP cannot be disregarded. She left GFI’s employ on 17 February 2015 and her employment with ICAP commenced on 18 May 2015 – a 3 month period. IPAC’s advisers likely advised that a 3 month restraint was reasonable and any longer period of restraint was not enforceable – hence the fact that this matter went to hearing.
Whilst this may in fact turn out that 3 months is the reasonable period after trial, IPAC took the wrong approach, knowing the lower threshold requirements in injunction applications as to ‘reasonable prospects of success at trial’.
In my view, I would suggest that a 3 month restraint is a short one. That said, it was certainily not worth taking the risk to defend it without ample authority being cited to the Court (which seems to have been lacking from the judgment itself).
ICAP would have been properly advised to be cautious in resisting the temporary injunction (and should have done so in correspondence before any proceedings were instituted). It is never clear cut where a short period of restraint is being defended. Indeed the Court here considered a number of cases where the 6 month restraint had been upheld and was easily able to be satisfied on the lower test.
What could the ex-employee have done? There is no doubt that the ex-employee could have been engaged in a non-conflicting advisory role, in the background, before her legitimate period of restraint of 6 months had expired. Indeed, this is what she might have to do in light of this decision.